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The partnership provided the Marine Corps squadrons with an increased opportunity to see combat action, but at a cost. As USMC squadrons "chopped", or shifted Operational Control (OPCON) to the Navy, they were unavailable to support the Marine Air-to-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) directly until post-deployment detachment from the Carrier Air Wing. Ironically, the Marine squadron's combat readiness would steadily decline throughout the course of the deployment cycle. This decline is attributed to the air wing's obligation to support the carrier's surface warfare requirements. In particular, core qualifications such as Close Air Support (CAS)
were neglected as the squadrons flew missions in support of the Carrier Battle Group.
Fiscal Problems
Despite an aggressive attempt by both the Navy and Marine Corps to do "more with 
"Procurement Mismanagement").
Unfortunately, the DoN did not possess the fiscal resources to fund the acquisitions designated in the 1990s. Furthermore, the Navy lacked maintenance resources and struggled with increasing problems associated with the aging legacy aircraft. 
Naval Aircraft Procurement
Collectively, the Navy/Marine aviation team was forced to stretch resources in an attempt to keep both the Carrier Air Wings and Marine Aircraft Wings operational. Unfortunately, this situation was not unique to the Navy and Marine Corps as both the Army and Air Force were also forced to tighten their belts and do more with less. As a result, the DPG was issued in which the SecDef challenged the services to streamline their programs and provide a less expensive, more responsive military to the taxpayers.
The Study
The DPG challenged all the services to transform and seek increased effectiveness and efficiency. In December of 2001, officials from the DoN and the Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) solicited the expertise of Whitney, Bradley, & Brown, Incorporated (WB&B) . WB&B is an independent "think-tank" composed predominantly of retired Navy and Marine Corps officers, and other experts in military affairs. WB&B was tasked to head the in-depth study of Naval Aviation and provide the Navy/Marine Corps Team with a recommendation satisfying the DPG.
The study focused solely on fixed-wing TacAir assets, as previous opportunities for integration have occurred in this area and fiscal requirements for TacAir represented the most significant portion of overall aviation budgets. 3 The study was guided by the following assumptions:
 Future force structure would include twelve Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) supported by ten active and one reserve CVW.
 The capacity of aviation-capable ships mirrored that of today's forces.
 The Unit Deployment Program (UDP) supporting Korea would continue.
 TacAir aviation units would maintain of minimum of ten aircraft per squadron after the transition to the F/A-18E/F and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
Additionally, the study examined the feasibility of disestablishing units, reducing the number of aircraft in units, and reducing the number of aircraft in non-deployable status. The effectiveness of the program recommendation was measured relative to today's force and the program of record. 4 Although the guidance from the SecDef's DPG was specific, the problem set underpinning the order was not. Subsequent discussions within the DoN and HQMC provided the focus: Maximize utility from strike-fighter forces that would be severely resourceconstrained as it was modernized. WB&B tasking focused on assessing integration and force structure alternatives compared to today's strike-fighter inventory and the inventory projected in the program of record. 5 The Navy's specific requirements centered on providing sufficient striking power from the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) while the Marine Corps' centered on providing direct support to the MAGTF. An additional focal point was the ability of each service to fulfill the other's missions, from both capability and training perspectives. Lastly, the study reviewed the procurement plan of the JSF. In particular, the Marine Corps' requirement for Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing versus the Navy's requirement for the CV-JSF. The WB&B study recommended a mix of both JSF aircraft.
The Recommendation
The results reached by WB&B recommended the following: (1) Decommission three active Navy squadrons and two reserve (total of 64 reduced to 59), (2) Reduce number of aircraft in squadrons from twelve to ten, (3 feelings are mixed in the Navy despite clearly having the most to gain and least to lose in the arrangement. Both sides argue that the whole transformation is happening too quickly, and serious concerns exist regarding the perceived lack of in-depth study and planning. These critics are armed with ammunition aimed at delaying TacAir Integration indefinitely.
The End of Marine Corps Tactical Aviation
When the news broke, many experts predicted TacAir Integration would lead to the end of Marine Corps tactical aviation as legacy aircraft died out. Others argued that it is the first step in eliminating Marine aviation altogether. To counter these arguments, Colonel Robert Walsh Other critics worry that the traditional ground-support mission of Marine aviation is in jeopardy. They cite current joint publications that refer to the obligations of Marine TacAir. Deep-rooted cultural biases have threatened the concept of TacAir Integration. The agreement, referred to as a "two-way street," is a union depending on the total commitment of both services. To that end, both services acknowledged the need to relinquish control of some assets. The Marine Corps will be required to send an additional six squadrons to the Navy's CVWs and decommission one reserve squadron. Conversely, the Navy will send three squadrons to the Marine Corps in order to support the UDP rotation while eventually decommissioning three active and one reserve squadron. More cynical critics state the position more straightforwardly. They argue that the Navy's commitment is assured because they simply cannot afford not to be committed. The answer is simple-because of fiscal limitations; they realize that they have no other choice. Armed Services Committee, acknowledged the hurdles the two services face while bringing their air forces together. "This is a tough one, because this has incredible cultural ties deep in our services," he told lawmakers. "And we, in effect, hired an outside negotiator to help us work through this." Admiral Clark was referring to the employment of WB&B. WB&B very pointedly stated that in order for their recommendation to work, the agreement must be a twoway street; both services would be required to make sacrifices.
Ultimately the Navy is willing to integrate TacAir because the rewards far outweigh the costs. They will enjoy significant fiscal savings as they decommission three active and one reserve squadron, yet they will still maintain the ability to support ten active and one reserve Carrier Air Wing. Conversely, the costs are minimal; the Navy will relinquish command of one Carrier Air Wing while making fundamental changes to the management of their training and readiness cycle. All in all, these actions appear to satisfy the SecDef's challenge of increased fiscal responsibility while maintaining the traditional effectiveness of the Carrier Air Wing.
Inability to Maintain Effectiveness During High-Intensity Conflicts
As stated in Joint Publication JP 0-2, "The primary mission of the MAGTF ACE is the support of the MAGTF Ground Combat Element (GCE) ." Yet, many argue that with fewer numbers of aircraft, and the fact that a significant number are populating the decks of the aircraft carriers, the MAGTF's Air Combat Element (ACE) loses potency. Agreeably, the Marine Corps has a great deal at risk by accepting a smaller force and these force structure reductions provide ammunition to the critics who argue that the ACE will struggle to support the MAGTF during a major conflict. Regardless, experts report that TacAir Integration should provide an increase in capability of sea-based aviation assets to support the Joint Force Commander, and should provide a more capable forward deployed combat power. support the MAGTF is presented in the WB&B study. The numbers provide a data point to counter the argument that TacAir Integration is incapable of supporting a major conflict. The study states that in a high-intensity campaign, fewer aircraft are available in the most stressing case (eight CSGs and eight ESGs deployed). However, the projected number of targets serviced exceeds the capability of today's forces by a wide margin, and represents a larger capability than that seen in Operation Desert Storm. 13 Regardless, the Marine Corps must have a voice in the determination of TacAir support requirements for the MAGTF and the ESG.
CHAPTER 3: ADVANTAGES OF TACAIR INTEGRATION Fiscal Savings
Throughout the 1990s, Naval TacAir, as did many other programs within the Department of Defense, underwent a procurement "holiday". While force structure and procurement budgets were reduced and operations increased, funding priorities migrated to readiness accounts.
14 Facing this "bow wave" of projected funding requirements for naval aviation in 2007 and beyond, both services sought ways to reduce the requirements.
The TacAir Integration plan is a culmination of a long-term effort to achieve greater combat capability with regard to 
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Photo courtesy of the author. Concerns that center on airframe lifespan issues relate to the fielding of the F/A-18 through fiscal year 2018. In order to meet that timeline, the F/A-18 will potentially require adjustments to current airframe limits. Of particular concern are the 2,000 Catapult and Arrested Landing (cat/trap) limits on F/A-18A/Cs. In order to meet the current fielding requirements, Engineering Inspections (EIs) are anticipated to determine the feasibility of adjusting the cat/trap limits in order to extend the current lifespan of legacy aircraft. These EIs will potentially extend the cat/trap limit to 2,250, the equivalent to an additional work-up and deployment.
Although the concerns regarding the airframe limits of the F/A-18 are understandable, it is the cost of level readiness that has most critics worried. The readiness costs for the Navy and Marine Corps to achieve level readiness may far exceed the ability to upgrade. In addition, readiness levels associated with the current implementation of TacAir Integration will not allow the DoN to surge more aircraft in the future than is within our means today. The lynchpin in the TacAir Integration plan is the improved business practices proposed by WB&B. These improved business practices coupled with sincere DoN commitment to maintenance and readiness accounts will ensure the modernization of legacy aircraft until suitable replacements are delivered to the Navy and Marine Corps. Improvements to business practices must be made and the reinvestment of savings will make the smaller force more capable.
Cultural Ties -Closer than Most Think
The Navy-Marine Team provides a unique capabilities-based force that exploits its maritime superiority by transforming the sea into a formidable and flexible sovereign base and an extension of the most powerful nation in the world in its ability to maintain global influence and protect our nation's interests.
17 TacAir Integration has The plan is to complete the tactical aviation integration within a decade. Officials say the integration will not require much of a cultural shift, since four Marine squadrons already deploy with Carrier Air Wings. Rear Admiral Thomas Kilcline, head of aviation plans and 17 Walsh, 38. 18 Walsh, 38. requirements, said the Carrier Air Wing as a whole benefits from having Navy and Marine Corps aviators operating together: Navy pilots learn Close Air Support and ground combat scheme of maneuver from Marines; while Marines learn more about Naval Strike Warfare from Navy brethren. "There is an awful lot of cross-talk between squadrons, and the air wing is better for it," he said.
19
Diverse Training Opportunities
Under the integration plan, Navy and Marine strike fighter squadrons will train, deploy, at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada. 21 The commonalities of the aircraft offer opportunities for aviators to build tactics and doctrine across a spectrum that is applicable to a wider variety of missions. In addition, this commonality should ease the transition from one version to the other, 19 Brown, 1. A recent study by the Center for Naval Analyses to determine the extent of aviation support required for MAGTF operations throughout the range of peace-time, wartime, and various combinations in between concluded that 31 ten-plane JSF squadrons would be required for a major theatre war, and 35 squadrons would be needed for a simultaneous small-scale contingency and major theatre war response. 34 The study determined that the higher carrierbased sortie rates coupled with increased effectiveness per sortie achieve an improved level of effectiveness in support of the MAGTF. In short, the carrier would get the aviators closer to the fight and the pilots flying modern tactical aircraft would deliver ordnance on target with unprecedented effectiveness for the MAGTF commander.
Freedom of Maneuver -Sovereignty at Sea
Throughout the 1990s, nations at all levels of development sought to alter U.S. policies by selectively extending and retracting access to facilities within their borders. Groups with embarked Marines provided the platforms for various missions ashore while denying the enemy the opportunity to strike back.
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At a time when warfare is becoming more "expeditionary," and land bases are a tough political sell in many countries around the world, the threat to forward air bases will grow. The fact of the matter is that tactical aviation is tied to those fixed forward bases. Sometimes we do fail to gain access to those bases for political reasons. 
CHAPTER 4: REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESS
The success or failure of TacAir Integration rests on the Navy/Marine Corps Team's ability to compromise on the issues involving equipment, manpower, and readiness. The devil is indeed in the details as planners embark in satisfying the requirements both services bring to the agreement. The issues requiring immediate attention are: (1) Global Sourcing, (2) Distribution of manpower, (3) Standardization of Training and Readiness, and (4) Improved funding for legacy aircraft. Fulfilling these requirements will be instrumental in the successful implementation of TacAir Integration.
Global Sourcing
Global Sourcing is a term to describe the distribution of forces across the earth. Under that premise, aircraft would be less rigidly apportioned to a specific Carrier Air Wing or Marine Sourcing is vital to the plan as we source each service's warfighting requirements from the pool of non-deployed DoN aircraft, but the concept seems easier said than done.
Impact of Global Sourcing
As the requirements of the MAGTF are addressed, sheer numbers of aircraft do not tell the entire story. Equally important to the number of aircraft, are the number of trained pilots to fly them, and troops to maintain them. When addressing the support that TacAir Integration can provide the MAGTF, we must address the issue of Training and Readiness.
Traditionally, Marine squadrons have striven for a level readiness curve throughout the training and deployment cycle. That is to say that Marine squadrons tend to maintain a relatively constant level of combat readiness regardless of their deployment status. Conversely, the Navy has consciously sacrificed combat readiness of non-deployable squadrons to support those in the deployment cycle. Historically, a typical deployable squadron would acquire the requisite pilots just prior to commencing the Carrier Air Wing work-up. The combat readiness of the pilots and the squadron as a whole would improve throughout the work-up and would peak at some point during the onset of the deployment. As the deployment wore on, the combat readiness would start to decline until it bottomed just prior to returning home. Once a deployment is complete, Navy and Marine squadrons alike tend to "burst" as personnel are allowed to accept transfers, or satisfy ground-training requirements.
Simultaneously, the non-deployable squadron's fleet of aircraft would dwindle as aircraft were transferred to the next deploying squadron, were inducted for scheduled or unscheduled depot level maintenance, or were simply victims of insufficient maintenance funds at the squadron level.
Consequently, the undesired consequence of the cyclic readiness during the deployment cycle is the "readiness bathtub". Global Sourcing makes peaks and valleys in readiness unacceptable. Squadrons suffering from this effect will be unable to effectively support the MAGTF, and this problem must be eliminated. Level readiness will allow a squadron at any stage in the deployment work-up cycle, whether carrier-or land-based, to surge to support contingency operations. Since, non-deployable units must be able to meet MAGTF requirements for war and peace, leadership of both the Navy and Marine Corps must support a change in philosophy that will enable squadrons to attain and maintain a level readiness cycle.
Distribution of Manpower
Traditionally, the Navy and Marine Corps have manned their squadrons uniquely, for mission specific reasons. Unfortunately, this dissimilarity in manpower creates concerns with regard to two critical areas: (1) Crew seat ratios for CVW squadrons, and (2) Maintenance manning for both USMC and USN squadrons. As stated in Naval Power 21, A Naval Vision, "Sailors and Marines are the foundation of our naval capabilities. Our physical platforms have no "asset value" to the nation until manned by trained, educated, and motivated people." The success of TacAir Integration depends on the intelligent allocation and training of personnel.
The current USMC table of organization has twelve-plane squadron's manning goal at nineteen pilots, with a staffing goal of seventeen pilots. Historically, Marine squadrons have been manned with eighteen pilots, or a crew/seat ratio of 1.5:1. Under a current Navy initiative, manning levels will target from twelve to sixteen pilots per squadron, or a crew/seat ratio of approximately 1.4:1. Assuming that the Marine squadrons will continue to meet current operational planning and contingency requirements, twelve to sixteen pilot squadrons are simply inadequate. Experience has shown that Marine squadrons struggle to meet core competency requirements with less than eighteen pilots. Therefore, the Navy and Marine Corps must agree that eighteen pilots will be the staffing goal for all deployed squadrons and adjust the crew/seat ratios to reflect the change.
Maintenance manpower issues exist in the Navy and in the Marine Corps. Specifically, shortfalls in the type and number of specialists assigned to each service's squadrons are significant. For example: the Navy squadrons expected to be assigned to Marine Aircraft to "chopping" to the Navy).
These deficiencies must be addressed prior to the first deployment of a Navy squadron to UDP. Failure to do so will result in under manning at the MAG level and a net reduction in effectiveness and efficiency.
Standardization of Training and Readiness
The Training and Readiness goal is to doctrinally tie the Navy and Marine TacAir forces.
Consequently, there are several training requirements linked to TacAir Integration. First of all,
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the merger of the training philosophies of both services is crucial to the development of a "single service" position on training plans as well as operational concepts of execution. In addition, the consolidation of the service's schoolhouses is essential to the integration of each service's area of expertise. The result will be service specific cultures that are fused to a common objective.
Finally, the determination of a common operational concept will create a truly interchangeable strike-fighter force. Common doctrine that is truly integrated and trained will allow the projection of power from a sea base to include phasing ashore from an ESF to achieve operational effects independent of or in support of MAGTF operations.
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The merger of training philosophies is a key enabler of the integration plan. This merger extends beyond the development of basic Training and Readiness (T&R) requirements and the merger of the service's schoolhouses. TacAir Integration requires the two services to bring planners together to review and revise T&R goals and requirements. In an effort to streamline the services, we must develop a plan to merge all education and training of Naval and Marine aviators. There should be a single source document that details all T&R requirements. If this is accomplished, Navy and Marine aviators, each with service specific culture, will bring increased effectiveness to the warfare commander.
Despite standardizing T&R, Navy aviators skilled in maritime interdiction, deep strike, air superiority, and suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses will still be able to focus training on those areas. Marine aviators schooled in the art of ground warfare, in addition to air delivered fires in support of ground maneuver, will still be able to focus training on CAS, Strike
Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR), Armed Reconnaissance, and Battlefield
Coordination. In order to maintain flexibility, both services should train and maintain minimum 49 Walsh, 41. proficiency in core plus mission skills to enable surge operations in a more narrowly defined mission set. The net result will be an increase in operational effectiveness of naval airpower.
Although the alignment of T&R requirements is a USN initiative, it makes sense that the services incorporate a set of common guidelines qualification and designation requirements. It is not important that the services weigh the requirements the same, however, it is important that they possess the same. Consider the following: both services regard the same requirements for a specific qualification or designation, but are allowed to deviate in terms of currency and combat readiness reporting. This scenario would satisfy the prerequisites for qualifications or designations, but would allow each service to weigh the value of the qualification against their service-specific culture.
By leveraging the centers of excellence, namely Naval Strike Air Warfare Center 
Improved Funding for Legacy Aircraft
The Navy and Marine Corps Team have embarked on a TacAir Integration plan that will enhance core combat capabilities and provide a more potent, cohesive, and affordable fighting force. A cornerstone of this plan is DoN funding and maintenance of legacy aircraft at the highest levels of readiness until replacement by the JSF. This requires a heightened strike fighter readiness across the DoN. 52 The readiness levels associated with integration will allow the DoN to surge more aircraft than is within our means today. 53 These adjustments will provide a more capable force, ensure better use of our precious assets, and create significant savings that will be applied to Navy and Marine Corps recapitalization and readiness.
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While proposed force structure slightly reduces the number of aircraft in certain squadrons, it retains enough aircraft to fully populate the flight decks of aviation-capable ships.
Improved reliability of both legacy and future aircraft is key to this aspect of the TacAir Integration. It preserves the daily sortie generation capability of the current sea-based force while increasing the level of effectiveness. 55 Furthermore, increased precision and lethality will serve as additional force multipliers that will allow a ten-plane JSF squadron to achieve effectiveness equal to or greater than a traditional twelve-plane strike-fighter squadron. Despite the cultural biases that have threatened TacAir Integration since inception, leadership of both the Navy and Marine Corps have pledged total commitment. The "two-way street" has forced both services to relinquish control of assets. Ultimately, the agreement is based on the following tenets:
 Increased Marine presence in the CVWs.
 Increased Navy participation in the UDP rotation.
 Capability of both services to surge in support of land-based operations.
To sum up the agreement, Deputy Commandant (Aviation), LtGen Mike Hough said, "The days of doing it on our own are over, and we must work together as a Navy-Marine Corps Team to ensure continued wellness of TacAir in the DoN."
Arguably, the Marine Corps has a lot a stake by accepting a smaller force and these force structure reductions provide critics with ammunition to argue that the ACE has lost potency and will struggle during a major conflict. However, experts have pointed out that TacAir Integration should provide a more robust capability through increased sortie rates coupled with increased effectiveness per sortie. TacAir Integration is expected to exceed the capability of today's forces by a wide margin, thus increasing the support provided to the MAGTF.
Bowing to the pressure of fiscal constraints, Navy and Marine Corps leadership sought an efficient yet combat effective alternative to the costly plan of record. Procurement mismanagement during the 1990s contributed to the "bow wave" of future costs now faced by the Navy/Marine Corps Team. These costs were climbing out of control and the aging fleet of legacy aircraft was suffering from years of neglect. TacAir Global Sourcing is a key enabler that provides the backbone in TacAir Integration.
Global Sourcing is the pooling of resources to service the needs of the MAGTF or the Combatant
Commander. These assets will be pulled from squadrons not currently in the deployment rotation, but can be quickly ordered to deploy, either attached to a Carrier Air Wing, or attached to a Marine Aircraft Group (MAG).
Global Sourcing is not strictly about numbers of aircraft. An equally important requirement for successful sourcing of potential contingencies is level readiness. Navy and Marine squadrons can no longer accept the "readiness bathtub" after returning home from deployment. Since non-deployable units must be able to meet MAGTF requirements for war and peace, the leadership of the Navy/Marine Team must support this fundamental change in philosophy that will enable more squadrons to attain a more level readiness and be available to surge in support of a potential contingency.
The distribution of manpower must also be uniform from one service to the other. The table of organization of squadrons in both services must reflect the desire for true 58 Clark, Vern, "Persistent Combat Power," United States Naval Institute-Proceedings, May 2003, 46. interoperability. Gone are the days of cross-decking personnel and equipment from one squadron to another to another, in order to support deployment requirements. Leadership of both services must agree to man squadrons at sufficient levels to support CVW and MAG requirements.
Standardized Training and Readiness is a goal that will doctrinally tie the Navy and Marine Corps. Three components will contribute to truly standardized Training and Readiness. 
